## NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH


## REVIEW BOARD

CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ENFORCEMENT SECTION,
DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND
INDUSTRY,

Complainant,

vs.

DILLARD'S, INC., a Delaware corporation, DILLARD'S NEVADA, INC., a Nevada corporation, DILLARD STORE SERVICES, INC., an Arizona corporation,



Docket No. RNO 07-1325

Respondent.

## DECISION

This matter having come before the NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD at a hearing commenced on the 11<sup>th</sup> day of April 2007, in furtherance of notice duly provided according to law, MR. ROB KIRKMAN, ESQ., counsel appearing on behalf of the Chief Administrative Officer of the Occupational Safety and Health Enforcement Section, Division of Industrial Relations (OSHES), and MR. TIM ROWE, ESQ., counsel appearing on behalf of respondent, DILLARD'S, INC., a Delaware corporation, DILLARD'S NEVADA, INC., a Nevada corporation, DILLARD STORE SERVICES, INC., an Arizona corporation; the NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD finds as follows:

Jurisdiction in this matter has been conferred in accordance with Nevada Revised Statute 618.315.

The complaint filed by the OSHES sets forth allegations of

violations of Nevada Revised Statutes as referenced in Exhibit "A", attached thereto.

Citation 1, Item 1(a) charges a "serious" violation of 29 CFR 1910.36(d)(1). The complainant alleges that the respondent employer failed to ensure an exit route door was unlocked at all times and not subject of special knowledge requirements to open. Specifically OSHES charges that the respondent employer permitted employees to work in an area controlled by an exit door which was locked and required special knowledge to open. The proposed penalty for the serious violation was grouped with other items in Citation 1 for the total sum of \$4,500.00.

Citation 1, Item 1(b) charges a "serious" violation of 29 CFR 1910.37(b)(2). The complainant alleges that the respondent did not ensure each exit at the upper and lower dock area was marked clearly with a sign reading "exit". Specifically OSHES charges that the respondent employer maintained an exit door located at the southwest section of the upper dock area which was not marked with a sign reading "exit"; further, the exit door located at the lower dock area south of the dock doors was not marked with a sign reading "exit". The violation was classified as serious and the proposed penalty for the violation was grouped with that referenced at Citation 1, Item 1(a).

Citation 1, Item 1(c) charges a "serious" violation of 29 CFR 1910.37(b)(5). The complainant alleges that the respondent employer failed to ensure each doorway along an exit route which could be mistaken for an exit was marked "not an exit" or identified by a sign indicating its actual use. Specifically OSHES charges that the respondent employer maintained at the upper dock area a doorway to

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a janitorial room which was not marked "not an exit" or with a similar designation or sign indicating its actual use. Further, at the upper dock area, a doorway to an alteration room was not marked "not an exit" or with a similar designation or sign indicating its actual use. The violation was classified as serious and the proposed penalty for the violation was grouped with that referenced at Citation 1, Item 1(a).

Counsel for the Chief Administrative Officer presented evidence and testimony with regard to the alleged violations. Safety and Health Representative (SHR) Mr. Chris Carling testified that he inspected the Dillard's Department Store site of respondent located at Highway 395 and the Mt. Rose Highway in Reno, Nevada. accompanied SHR Ms. Jennifer Cox during the inspection. Mr. Carling testified that he and Ms. Cox met with the designated employer representative Ms. Genzer an assistant manager for the Dillard's Department Store. After an opening conference, the inspection was conducted during business hours. The SHRs were directed to the Dillard's Department Store site based on an anonymous complaint. In furtherance of the anonymous complaint Mr. Carling observed exit doors in the loading dock areas (upper and lower) as well as various items of inventory and merchandise. Complainant's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, admitted in evidence by stipulation, provided photographic depictions of the doors subject of the citation. Mr. Carling testified that he confirmed the lower dock door, subject of Citation 1, Items 1(a) and 1(b)(b), was locked and not marked. informed him the lower dock door was normally locked to deter employee theft. Mr. Carly testified that Ms. Genzer also informed him that while there were other means to exit the building during an

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emergency, the lower dock door could be opened by supervisory personnel who maintained keys, the door was subject of a 15 second delayed opening mechanism which permitted same to open if pressed for 15 seconds, the building fire system overrides the door lock. and security cameras continuously monitored the area such that the door lock could be disabled from a master control panel in the security office. SHR Carling testified that the printed instructions on the door, depicted in Exhibit 3, directed that the door could be opened by pressing the push bar for 15 seconds and releasing same. Mr. Carling also testified that there was no sign on or near either of the dock doors indicating or marking them as an "exit". Ms. Genzer informed SHR Carling that the lower dock door was used for regular employee ingress and egress, specifically while reporting for work and departing the store for any purposes, but could also be used for emergency purposes. SHR Carling testified that he was informed by the management representative that employees had been trained in emergency procedures.

On cross-examination by respondent counsel, SHR Carling testified that he did indeed test the lower dock locked door in accordance with the instructions and it opened if pushed for 15 seconds. He further testified that if a fire occurs anywhere in the store, the subject door automatically unlocks along with all others.

On board examination of SHR Carling, he responded that no safety logs were requested or obtained to verify employee training.

Counsel for complainant then presented evidence and witness testimony from SHR Ms. Jennifer Cox. Ms. Cox testified that she was the co-inspector on the subject site with Mr. Carling. Ms. Cox testified that she inquired of Ms. Genzer with regard to employee

training and use of the lower dock door. Ms. Genzer informed her that employees enter and exit the lower dock door routinely and were trained in its use. SHR Cox further testified that from her observations there was no sign marking the dock doors (lower or upper) as "exit" or "not an exit".

On cross-examination Ms. Cox testified that she saw many areas and doors marked "exit". Exhibit 4 admitted in evidence by stipulation depicted all designated emergency exits and routes as well as other non-emergency designated exit doors. On further cross-examination Ms. Cox confirmed that only the orange marked doors were designated fire or emergency exits. She testified that the subject doors cited in Items 1(a) and (b) were not shown on Exhibit 4 to be a designated fire or emergency exit.

On board questioning, Ms. Cox testified that she had not requested or referenced the Master Exiting Plan, the Uniform Building Code nor the Uniform Fire Code and therefore did not know the subject diagram to be in non-compliance with same. On further board questioning Ms. Cox testified that she did not request or review safety meeting logs to determine whether employees were trained in identification of emergency exit and/or other ingress or egress doors.

The direct and cross examination of complainant witnesses encompassed issues with regard to the Citation 1 serious violations alleged at Items 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c). At Item 1(b), an alleged violation of 29 CFR 1910.37(b)(2), referenced upper and lower dock doors, including that depicted in Exhibit 3, (Item 1(b)(b) references the same locked dock door identified at Item 1(a)). The doors were cited as violative because they were determined by the

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inspector to be exit doors and not marked with signs identifying them as an "exit." At Item 1(a), the door was also cited for being a locked exit located along an "exit route." Item 1(c) referenced each doorway along an "exit route," specifically the janitorial and alteration room doors which could be mistaken for an exit and not marked "exit" or "not an exit."

Respondent counsel presented a defense of non-applicability of the standards principally through Exhibit 4 and the testimony of Mr. Cliff Heller, the Reno Dillard's Store General Manager. Mr. Heller testified that he is in overall charge of the safety at the Dillard's Department Store site. He testified that he maintains an emergency evacuation plan and that employee emergency path diagrams are posted in all work areas where no direct visibility to emergency exit signs might be readily observed. He described the diagram in Exhibit 4 as showing the company security and alarm plan and the emergency exit route, including that for the areas subject of the Citation 1. He testified that the diagram depicts the "lower dock door" which is the focal point of the Citation 1, Items 1(a) and 1(b)(b) as further depicted in Exhibit 3. He testified that the lower dock door is the only door used for employee ingress and egress during work hours. Mr. Heller testified that the fire department has inspected the property on approximately eleven occasions and there have been no fire department issues involving the store exits or the subject cited doors. Mr. Heller further testified that the dock doors cited are not designated emergency exits and therefore not marked accordingly.

On cross-examination Mr. Heller testified that the subject lower dock door depicted in Exhibit 3 is utilized by employees when

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arriving and departing work, during lunch breaks and for other general purposes. He stated the lower dock door area is called the "dock and receiving area." Employees "clock in" at that area as the time clock is within seven to eight feet of the door cited as shown in Exhibit 3. He testified that the door not only bears printed instructions regarding opening, but it also is subject of regular daily use by the employees, and monitored on a reasonably constant basis by store security personnel.

On closing argument, counsel for complainant stated that as to Citation 1(b) there is no question the doors lacked signage designation as an exit and were indeed "exit" doors. argued that as to Item 1(c), the janitorial and alteration room doors could easily be mistaken for exits during an emergency and should have been marked in accordance with the cited standard because they were "along an exit route." He further argued that based upon the dock doors shown in Exhibit 3 unmarked as exits in violation of Item 1(b) then it clearly follows that Items 1(a) and 1(c) doors along the "exit route" are in violation based upon the testimony of SHRs Carling and Cox. Counsel argued that the alternate methods for opening the lower dock door requiring a key, awaiting a 15 second delay, "buzzed out" by a security guard, electric override, or reading the printed instructions were not sufficient to satisfy standard compliance. In particular, the lower dock door requires "special knowledge" for employee operation and therefore violative of the cited standard. He further argued that during times of emergency, people panic and it is reasonable to conclude they could easily mistake unmarked doors along emergency routes for exits. Counsel concluded his argument stating that

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Respondent presented closing argument focusing the recognized defense of inapplicability of the standard. argued that the referenced OSHA standards are being misapplied by OSHES to the subject doors. He argued that the dock area doors depicted in the exhibits are simply not intended, designated or utilized as emergency "exit doors" nor on designated emergency "exit Counsel argued that one must read the entirety of the routes". standard section commencing with 1910.35 and subpart understand the overall application which is limited to safe means of egress from ". . . fire and like emergencies." He further referenced the fundamental requirements identified in the section to apply ". . . in case of fire or other emergency." Counsel stated that dock doors were never intended, designated or identified as a fire or emergency exit doors under the city building code, specific fire code, nor the company emergency evacuation plan setting forth emergency exit doors and emergency routes. Counsel argued that OSHES takes the subject standard out of context and attempts to hold the respondent responsible for marking non-emergency designated doors under the fire and emergency standard when said doors are not so designed or designated. He also argues that not every door needs to be marked with something indicating it is or is not an exit but only those that are so intended or along the designated emergency route.

Counsel for respondent argued that the citation at Item 1(a) is additionally inapplicable to the case facts in that there is no "special knowledge" required to open the locked dock door which is

marked with instructions for a 15 second delay. He argues that every employee who becomes employed with the respondent is trained in the use of the subject door as it is the primary and sole entrance for employees reporting to or departing from work and to access the time clock. The door operation is subject of common daily employee use. Counsel further argues that even should the cited standard be applicable to the facts, there would be no violation of the "special knowledge" provisions.

Counsel submits that the OSHES position alleging violations do not "make sense" in the emergency use context based on the testimony of SHR Cox. She testified that if one boarded up the door completely there would be no violation. He argues that such a position leads to an absurd result because the employees would have even reduced access to the outside if there was some kind of an emergency where currently they have an extra way out.

Finally, counsel argued that even if one assumed the violations as cited, then same should not be classified as serious because the employees merely had additional exits in the event of an emergency which were more than the fire code requirements therefore the chance of serious injury remote.

In reviewing the facts, testimony and evidence, the board notes that this is not only a case of first impression in Nevada, but no case law could be found interpreting the standard in the context of the citations.

To find substantial evidence by a preponderance to meet the burden of proof that violations occurred, it must first be determined whether the standard is applicable to the facts.

To establish a prima facie case, the

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Secretary (Chief Administrative Officer) must prove the **existence of a violation**, the exposure of employees, the reasonableness of the abatement period, and the appropriateness of the penalty. See <u>Bechtel Corporation</u>, 2 OSHC 1336, 1974-1975 OSHD ¶18,906 (1974); Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co., 1 OSHC 1219, 1971-1973 OSHD ¶15,047. (1972). (Emphasis added.)

All facts forming the basis of a complaint must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. See <u>Armor Elevator Co.</u>, 1 OSHC 1409, 1973-1974 OSHD ¶16,958 (1973).

In all proceedings commenced by the filing of a notice of contest, the burden of proof rests with the Administrator. (See NAC 618.788(1).

Board analysis is first directed to the meaning of an emergency exit, convenience door or other means of ingress and egress. The plain meaning of words must be recognized and if needed, ascertained by first considering its commonsense meaning. General Motors Corp., 17 OSHC 1217 (1995), affirmed, 89 F.2d 313 The board finds that clearly not every door in a business (1996).establishment with employees must be marked "exit" or "not an exit". 29 CFR 1910.35 identifies the fundamentals and requirements of the section as applicable to ". . . fire . . . or emergency . . . means of ingress and egress." The evidence and testimony, including the emergency plan diagram at Exhibit 4, demonstrate that the door cited at Items 1(a) and 1(b)(b) was not intended to be, identified as, nor designated as an emergency exit or fire door. The standard does not require it to be marked as an "exit". The board finds that even should the dock door depicted in Exhibit 3 have been designated as an emergency exit, no "special knowledge" for employee operation was The unrefuted testimony of Mr. Heller was that all required. employees were trained in use of the door. The testimony of both

SHRs Carling and Cox as well as Mr. Heller was that the employees used the Exhibit 3 dock door daily, routinely, as their primary means of ingress and egress to the building. The door was commonly used by the employees therefore no "special knowledge" under the cited standard could even be inferred.

Complainant presented no evidence of the Master Exiting Plan, the Uniform Building Code nor the Uniform Fire Code emergency exit requirements or designations. Exhibit 4 did not depict nor identify the upper or lower dock doors as designated for fire or emergency exit purposes.

Complainant did not meet its burden of proof to establish a violation of Items 1(a) and 1(b)(b) by substantial or a preponderance of evidence that the lower dock door identified in the exhibits was subject to the cited standard as an emergency "exit" door requiring marking or an emergency "exit route" door that required "special knowledge" to open.

The board in analyzing the alleged violations at Item 1(c) referencing 29 CFR 1910.37(b)(5) and Item 1(b)(a) referencing 29 CFR 1910.37(b)(2) found the bases for violations.

At Item 1(b)(a), the evidence established that the **upper** dock door was on an exit route and required marking as an exit pursuant to the cited standard.

The testimony and evidence presented by complainant established a prima facia case of violation with regard to the janitorial room and alteration room doors under the cited standard. There was no testimony or evidence to refute the allegations of the complaint and SHR testimony that the janitorial and alteration room doors were along an exit route and susceptible to mistaken use in

serious injury.

Citation 1.

Based upon the above and foregoing, it is the decision of the NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD that violations of Nevada Revised Statutes did occur as to Citation 1, Item 1(b) (a), 29 CFR 1910.37(b) (2) and Item 1(c), 29 CFR 1910.37(b) (5). The violations were properly classified as "serious". The proposed penalty is reduced due to the level of seriousness and a penalty is confirmed in the amount of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS (\$1,000.00).

the event of fire or emergency if not marked "not an exit."

doors differ from the principal ingress and egress dock door

identified in Exhibit 3 which was marked with opening instructions

and subject of both employee training and common use. During a time

of fire, emergency, or panic, employees could reasonably mistake the

janitorial and alteration room doors as exits and suffer death or

identification in the familiar work area is somewhat remote and

provides a basis for reducing the level of seriousness and penalty

assessed; however the potential for serious injury or death remains.

The unmarked doors are not permitted in the workplace pursuant to

the mandate of 29 CFR 1910.37(b)(5) as referenced in Item 1(c) of

Employee error or mistake as to exit door

It is the further decision of the NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD that no violation of Nevada Revised Statutes did occur as to Citation 1, Items 1(a) 29 CFR 1910.36(d)(1). The proposed grouped penalty for the violation attributable to same is denied.

The Board directs counsel for the complainant, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ENFORCEMENT SECTION, DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, to submit

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD and serve copies on opposing counsel within twenty (20) days from date of decision. After five (5) days time for filing any objection, the final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law shall be submitted to the NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD by prevailing counsel. Service of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law signed by the Chairman of the NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD shall constitute the Final Order of the BOARD.

DATED: This <u>30th</u> day of May, 2007.

NEVADA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW BOARD

TOM B. WATTERS, Chairman